

**FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSEMENT: SLK FUELING AND DISTRIBUTING  
CANVILLE WASHINGTON**

**CONDUCTED from November 1, 2003 to November 15, 2003, by  
Farsight Security Consultants and Mr. Tempus Font.**

Background: SLK Fueling and Distributing (the Facility henceforth) has been at its current location for forty years. Founded under the umbrella of John Doe Incorporated Industries the original facility received diesel oil from ships and barges to transfer to rail and truck for sale in Washington, Montana, Oregon and Idaho.

Ten years ago a refitting of the facility added fishing vessel fueling stations and more acreage. The facility is regulated by a variety of agencies. Each has been satisfied with all safety and compliance efforts made in the past.

There are eight personnel from the facility whose primary job is security. They are in two person 12 hour shifts, four days on then four days off. Other personnel on the facility have been trained to stand in as assistants and can stand the watches as long as one of the primary persons is also on the watch. A chain link eight foot fence extended by three strands of barbed wire on angled out brackets to ten feet.

Attached is a rough chart of the facility, which shall be referred to in this report. The key is as follows:

- a. is the Fishing Vessel Moorage (max four vessels)
- b. is the Barge moorage (max two barges)
- c. is the Ship pier (max one 500 foot tanker)
- d. Main Gate
- e. Truck loading station
- f. Admin/support/garage and lube oil storage is in this area
- g. Rail car loading area
- h. Tank farm (Bunker oil 50000 bbls/diesel 100000 x2)

Note that the structures marked in red are security structures added or refurbished in the year. The Main gate guard house is being outfitted to act as an alternate to the admin office for a command post with a duplicate Facility Security Officer's Office.

Day One: Having discussed at length the needs of the facility for security and the requirements of the new and the old regulations that affect this location we planned to do a walk through on day one. This occurred as scheduled and it was determined to follow up with a survey of the approaches from land and water.

Concluded that the location is remote and will need to stand alone in providing security response and preparedness. The closest habitation is the a fishing village five miles away. Then twenty miles away is Canville. Access by water is relatively easy, the depth rapidly drops off into the bay and there are no obstructions within two miles of this shoreline. Shoreside there are heavily grown forest areas and one 40 acre cow pasture nearby. While providing cover these forests limit the type of physical assault that can be mounted.

- 1. Fences adequate and not damaged.
- 2. Lighting sufficient for perimeter on a clear evening
- 3. Fences are unattended and breachable for the majority of the day. Crossing on to the facility unseen would be relatively easy.
- 4. Gates are well surveyed by cameras.
- 5. Camera protective housing beyond normally seen standards.

Day Two Interviews were conducted with the eight personnel who are primarily responsible for security. These persons had combined fifty years experience at the facility. This made for a wealth of anecdotal tales which can be incorporated into the drill and exercise programs.

Also, recurrent difficulties with recreational fishermen wandering on to the facility and petty theft at the barge and fishing vessel moorage areas were developed from these interviews. These seem to be the soft targets most likely to be exploited. The railcar and truck loading areas are relatively difficult to access from off facility, are locked when not in use and are protected from damage by redundant shut off mechanisms.

Conclusion: These two days were followed by picture taking of the facility from the rail areas, waterside, moorages and road. In all, five days were spent gathering the background information and survey to plug into assessment tools for RBDM. The method chosen to assess Risk was taken from the Coast Guard NVIC as recommended in the Regulations. Ten items were considered:

- 1 Bombthreat
- 2 Stowaway
- 3 Armed and Angry Employee
- 4 Armed and Angry Fisherman
- 5 Missing Vessel Crewman
- 6 Disabled Vessel at the dock
- 7 Radiacal Environmental Demonstration Blockade
- 8 Violent Labor Demonstration
- 9 Recreational Boater too close for comfort
- 10 Vandalism

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